Kunal Singh

My first book project, titled Nipping the Atom in the Bud: Strategies of Counterproliferation and How States Select Among Them, develops a novel theory to explain the full spectrum of counterproliferation behavior of states. For this book project, I have conducted elite interviews in India and Israel. My interviewees include a former prime minister, former cabinet ministers, national security advisors, military intelligence personnel, air force commanders, nuclear scientists, and several top diplomats and bureaucrats.

I first develop a typology of counterproliferation strategies. A state facing the prospect of a counterpart developing nuclear weapons has five options. First, it can launch a military attack on the key nuclear facilities of the proliferant. I call this kinetic reversion. Second, the counterproliferator can threaten military action to coerce the proliferant to halt its pursuit of the bomb. It can also use force in moderation to make its threats of a bigger military attack more credible. I call this strategy military coercion. Third, the counterproliferator can use its diplomatic and economic leverage over the proliferant to coerce it to give up its pursuit of the bomb. This strategy is called diplomatic inhibition. Fourth, the counterproliferator can try to pool resources with a great power ally to stop the proliferant’s weapons program. I call this strategy pooled prevention. Finally, a counterproliferator may choose not to do anything to stop the proliferant. This strategy is called accommodation.

I argue that a counterproliferator considers a costly strategy like kinetic reversion when it expects a large decline in the relative balance of power as a result of the proliferant successfully acquiring nuclear weapons. Small, conventionally capable states perceive an existential threat against large rivals with nuclear weapons. They believe they can defend themselves against conventional attacks but would be obliterated by only a handful of nuclear weapons. Even if such states acquire nuclear weapons, they are not confident of maintaining second-strike capability because of their geographical limitations against large rivals. These states are highly motivated counterproliferators and consider a costly strategy like kinetic reversion before diplomatic options. On the other hand, states that expect a smaller decline in the relative balance of power consider diplomatic inhibition as their first option. Such lowly motivated counterproliferators threaten a military attack, or choose military coercion, only when they lack credible coercive leverage to diplomatically bargain with the proliferant. Counterproliferators that can neither mount a military attack nor possess credible coercive leverage to bargain with the proliferant seek to pool resources with a great power ally. In other words, they choose pooled prevention. Finally, such states, if they do not have a great power ally, end up accommodating the prospect of a new nuclear weapons state.

I test this theory on three sets of cases. For the first, I choose one counterproliferator (Israel) that went up against three proliferants (Iraq, Syria, and Iran). Israel chose kinetic reversion against Iraq and Syria but selected a combination of pooled prevention and military coercion against Iran. In the second, I compare the counterproliferation strategies pursued by India and Pakistan against each other. India chose a mix of diplomatic inhibition and military coercion whereas Pakistan selected only diplomatic inhibition. In the final set, I choose one proliferant, China, being stopped by three counterproliferators (the United States, Taiwan, and the Soviet Union). The United States chose to accommodate the Chinese nuclear weapons program after considering preventive strikes. Taiwan chose a combination of pooled prevention and military coercion. Lastly, the Soviet Union first chose accommodation before moving to diplomatic inhibition and military coercion after the Sino-Soviet split.